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Abstract 
 
Polio provocation has concerned health professionals for nearly a 
century. Before the discovery of an effective polio vaccine in 1955, 
evidence that certain paediatric injections could precipitate a polio 
infection and severe forms of paralysis informed medical debates, 
experiments, and shifts in public health policy. This article explores 
how the theory was received and approached in the United States and 
the consequences of its protracted resolution. It contends that although 
medical professionals sought to maximize health benefits for American 
citizens, varying conceptions of what constituted an appropriate 
balance of risk inspired diverse health policy outcomes. 
 
 
‘We certainly will not ask any doctor to hold up a diphtheria shot when it is 
needed,’ explained a New York City Health Department spokesperson in the 
summer of 1951, ‘but we are asking everyone to be particularly cautious about 
injecting any substance during a possible polio epidemic.’1 This heedful assertion 
hints at a debate that simmered for generations, affecting American health 
professionals and civilians. Just as public health programs were burnishing their 
credibility at mid-twentieth century, an adverse health link was discovered between 
                                                 
1 ‘State Acts to Curb Polio Spread Peril,’ New York Times, 13 June 1951, 30. 
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paediatric injections and poliomyelitis.2 According to observers, some inoculated 
children faced a higher risk of developing paralytic polio in the limb receiving an 
injection. Termed polio provocation, this clinical manifestation was troubling for 
Americans, since it undermined the benefits of public health programs and 
threatened the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship. Medical professionals were 
forced into an uncomfortable position of considering whether injections intended to 
prevent some illnesses might also be causing another. 
This article engages with historical scholarship at the intersection of polio and 
public health. Polio historians have examined the nature of epidemics and the 
consequences for stricken individuals and their families before a national response 
to the disease was undertaken.3 They have also focused on the discovery of the 
Salk and Sabin vaccines and how they reduced the incidence of polio in America.4 
Complementing these works, public health historians have studied the character of 
                                                 
2 James Colgrove, State of Immunity: The Politics of Vaccination in Twentieth-
Century America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 
Chapter 3. 
3 Naomi Rogers, Dirt and Disease: Polio Before FDR (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1996). 
4 David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story: The Crusade that Mobilized the 
Nation Against the 20th Century's Most Feared Disease (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Jane S. Smith, Patenting the Sun: Polio and the Salk Vaccine (New 
York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1990). 
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polio immunization campaigns and the range of outcomes.5 Despite these important 
contributions, historians have not examined polio provocation, which arose in the 
1920s, waned in the late 1950s, and resurfaced in the 1980s. 
By drawing on archival records, historical newspapers, and medical journals, 
this article traces the evolution of polio provocation and assesses how health 
professionals imagined, debated, and negotiated its effect. It reveals the challenges 
of balancing health risks at a time of clinical uncertainty and the inadvertent 
consequences of medical programs designed to reduce suffering and save lives. The 
risk posed by declining herd immunity from halting paediatric immunizations versus 
the risk of inciting paralytic polio from adhering to public health orthodoxy framed the 
debate. The article argues that although health professionals attempted to minimize 
illness and disease exposure, divergent ideas of what constituted an acceptable 
balance of risk inspired varying outcomes.6 Even though polio provocation was 
freighted on a considerable body of empirical evidence, uncertainty about its 
                                                 
5 Colgrove, State of Immunity, Chapter 4; Sydney Ann Halpern, Lesser Harms: The 
Morality of Risk in Medical Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 
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6 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection 
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epidemiological mechanism and doubts as to the veracity of scientific reporting 
allowed room for subjective interpretations. Despite disagreement, most American 
health professionals achieved a compromise in which inoculation practices were 
reformed to reduce the risk of inciting polio. However, failure to unlock the 
epidemiological mechanism behind polio provocation until the 1990s rationalized 
sustained uncertainty, which affected international public health programs for 
decades. 
 
The Origins of Polio Provocation 
 
For the first half of the twentieth century, many Americans considered polio a 
frightening disease.7 Although most polio infections passed unnoticed or with mild 
symptoms, in some cases the virus entered the blood stream and targeted the motor 
neurons of the spinal cord. Depending on the location and severity of the attack, 
complications could result in paralysis or death. Polio’s notable seasonal occurrence, 
affinity for children, and legacy of disability tested the fortitude of survivors, families, 
and communities alike.8 ‘At the height of the epidemic,’ a Minnesota physician 
remembered, ‘the people of Minneapolis were so frightened that there was nobody in 
the restaurants. There was practically no traffic, the stores were empty. It just was 
considered a feat of bravado almost to go out and mingle in the public.’9 To curtail 
epidemics, parents were advised to keep children rested, clean, and away from 
                                                 
7 Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story, 8. 
8 Ibid., 27. 
9 Richard Aldrich in A Paralyzing Fear: The Triumph over Polio in America (New 
York: TV Books, 1998), 113. 
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sources of contamination, such as swimming pools or movie theatres. The continual 
threat of polio ultimately increased anxiety and shaped cultural norms. 
As part of a national effort to fight polio, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
his law partner Basil O’Connor, formed the National Foundation for Infantile 
Paralysis (NFIP) in 1938. The mandate of this charity was to sponsor public 
education programs, acute and convalescent polio care, and medical research.10 To 
support its ambitious mission, the NFIP collected donations from Americans through 
the annual March of Dimes fundraising drive, which exploited prevailing fears about 
polio to generate revenue.11 Through flashy publicity campaigns and powerful 
cinematic productions, polio was recast as a spectre that haunted playgrounds and 
infected innocent children.12 Americans’ growing concern about the disease 
bolstered the NFIP mandate and inspired research into causes and prevention. 
With the financial backing of the NFIP, medical professionals and researchers 
examined whether social or environmental factors exacerbated the risk of polio 
infection. Older causation theories implicating immigrants or poor hygiene were 
slowly supplanted by new concepts, such as the physiological consequences of 
bruising, fatigue, sore throats, common colds, pregnancy, or diet.13 By the 1940s, 
polio was no longer conceived by most Americans as a disease rooted in 
insalubrious tenements, but an affliction targeting prosperous, active, and aspiring 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 53-69. 
11 Smith, Patenting the Sun, 82. 
12 Rogers, Dirt and Disease, 30. 
13 Benjamin P. Sandler, Diet Prevents Polio (Lee Foundation for Nutritional 
Research, 1951); R. K. P., ‘Factors That Predispose to Polio,’ New York Times, 19 
August 1951, 135. 
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people. March of Dimes campaigns, directed at predominantly middle-class donors, 
helped to fuel the association.14 In fact, many medical experts attributed President 
Roosevelt’s paralysis of 1921 to his arduous travel and strenuous cold water swim 
off the coast of Campobello Island.15 The shifting conception of polio combined with 
new causation theories normalized the disease as arising from a complex 
interrelationship between personal characteristics and precipitating factors. 
Since polio was endemic in America during the first half of the twentieth 
century and could be present on objects, surfaces, or skin, it posed an unremitting 
danger to those who did not enjoy protection from appropriate disease-fighting 
antibodies.16 However, for some observers, the risk of polio infection appeared to be 
compounded in the aftermath of specific forms of surgery or immunization. Although 
doctors did not have the technology to assess the epidemiological mechanism, 
strong evidence between polio and certain medical interventions began to be 
recognized. 
Among the first procedures to be implicated was tonsil surgery.17 In 1910, 
doctors observed that children who underwent throat surgery during a polio epidemic 
also faced an elevated risk of contracting bulbar polio seven to fourteen days after 
the operation. British and American doctors later corroborated this finding in 1937.18 
                                                 
14 Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story, 90. 
15 Smith, Patenting the Sun, 45-47. 
16 Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story, 8.  
17 C. K. Mills, ‘The Tonsillectomy-Poliomyelitis Problem,’ Laryngoscope, 56 
(December 1951): 1188-94. 
18 Fischer and Stillerman, ‘Acute Anterior Poliomyelitis in New York in 1935: A 
Review of Six Hundred and Eighty-Six Cases,’ American Journal of Diseases of 
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Although supporters of this hypothesis were not wholly opposed to tonsil surgery, 
they warned fellow clinicians that ‘operations in the nose and throat area should not 
be performed during epidemics.’19 As case histories strengthened the possible 
adverse health link, medical researchers and epidemiologists attempted to measure 
the correlation. The director of the Harvard Infantile Paralysis Commission 
conducted a detailed study of over 2,000 case histories, concluding that tonsil 
surgery led to a significant danger of bulbar polio.20 In one instance, a family from 
Akron, Ohio, submitted five of their six children to tonsillectomies. Within two weeks, 
all five children developed bulbar polio and only two survived.21 Through such heart-
wrenching case histories, doctors became aware of the need to balance the risk of 
provoking polio with the purported benefits of removing tonsils. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Children, 54 (1937): 984-1004; Gerald N. Grob, ‘The Rise and Decline of 
Tonsillectomy in Twentieth-Century America,’ Journal of the History of Medicine and 
Allied Sciences, 62, 4 (October 2007): 383-421; D. M. Anderson and J. H. Dixon, 
‘Acute Bulbar Paralysis: Report of Two Cases,’ The British Medical Journal 
(November 1938): 1077-1079. 
19 Alfred E. Fischer, ‘Poliomyelitis After Tonsillectomy,’ British Medical Journal 
(March 1939), 533. 
20 W. L. Aycock, ‘Tonsillectomy and Poliomyelitis: Epidemiologic Considerations,’ 
Medicine, 21 (February 1942): 65-94. 
21 T. Francis, C. E. Krill, J. A. Toomey, and W. N. Mack, ‘Poliomyelitis Following 
Tonsillectomy in Five Members of a Family: An Epidemiologic Study,’ Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 119, 17 (1942): 1392-1396; ‘Poliomyelitis After 
Tonsillectomy,’ The Lancet (November 1942), 552. 
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American doctors were divided over the clinical evidence implicating tonsil 
surgery. Proponents, such as Major-General E. A. Noyes, stated categorically ‘that 
the policy of the United States Army has been to stop tonsil and adenoid operations 
during epidemics.’ However, some practicing otolaryngologists reasoned that there 
were too many ‘disadvantages in postponing the tonsil and adenoid operation, 
including prolongation of general malaise and the danger of complications.’22 Such 
assertions were justified by a small body of research, claiming no apparent 
correlation between throat surgery and polio provocation.23 Some health 
professionals attacked what they perceived to be the work of medical fearmongers 
and assured clinicians that ‘the danger of contracting poliomyelitis following recent 
tonsillectomy [was] minimal.’24 The lack of consensus forced many American 
physicians and surgeons to measure the risks on a case-by-case basis. 
Anxiety surrounding the hypothesis peaked in 1950 with an increase in the 
number of tonsillectomy operations and a corresponding spike in the incidence of 
bulbar polio.25 Fresh clinical evidence, including an article published by Dr Gaylord 
W. Anderson, a Harvard graduate and head of the University of Minnesota’s School 
of Public Health, showed that tonsillectomies appeared to treble the risk of children 
                                                 
22 V. E. Negus, ‘Poliomyelitis and Tonsillectomy,’ The Lancet (10 July 1948), 72. 
23 J. W. Traynor, ‘Tonsillectomy and Poliomyelitis in Southern Iowa, 1948-1949,’ 
Journal of the Iowa Medical Society, 40 (August 1950): 400-402. 
24 C. D. Wimborne and J.R. Stainsbury, Laryngoscope, 57 (1947): 573. 
25 J. Alison Glover, ‘Poliomyelitis and Tonsillectomy,’ Public Health (May 1950): 154-
155; J. Alison Glover, ‘The Incidence of Tonsillectomy in School Children,’ 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 31, 10 (August 1938): 1219-1236.  
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developing polio paralysis.26 This new data established a theory of polio provocation, 
which in turn inspired some doctors to bring the issue to public attention. Evening 
Capital readers of Annapolis, Maryland, were warned by a local doctor that ‘the only 
thing I can say is that I would not want to have my children’s tonsil’s removed when 
there was a considerable amount of polio in the area in which we lived.’27 Although 
not all doctors agreed with the theory, many heeded cautionary advice and 
postponed tonsil surgery until the summer polio season had subsided. The possibility 
of polio infection was not only a health risk in its own right, but it had become a larger 
clinical consideration and a public relations problem for medical practitioners. The 
power of doctors to practice along orthodox lines was being eroded by an unseen 
viral enemy. 
Coinciding with the tonsillectomy debate and exacerbating public anxiety 
about the consequences of medical interventions was evidence that certain 
paediatric injections could also predispose individuals to severe forms of polio. The 
first reports of this hypothesis were published in 1914 by German physicians, who 
noted that children receiving Neosalvarsan injections for the treatment of congenital 
syphilis later became paralyzed in the recipient limb.28 Similar findings were reported 
                                                 
26 Gaylord W. Anderson, ‘The Risk of Poliomyelitis After Tonsillectomy,’ The Annals 
of Otology, Rhinology, and Laryngology, 59, 3 (September 1950): 602. 
27 Edwin P. Jordan, M.D., ‘The Doctor Answers,’ The Evening Capital, 23 June 1950, 
4. 
28 H. Kern, ‘Ueber eine anstaltsendemie von Heine Medinscher krankheit,’ 
Muenchen Medizinische Wochenschrift, 61 (1914): 1053-55; Alterthum, ‘Lues 
Congenita und Poliomyelitis,’ Deutsch. Med. Wochenschr., 13 (30 March 1928): 522. 
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among children receiving cholera vaccine in France and smallpox vaccine in Italy.29 
Although these results were not reproducible in the laboratory due to technological 
limitations, the association between certain immunizations and polio provocation 
gained traction among many European health professionals. 
Despite the international dissemination of medical knowledge, the proposed 
link between injections and polio provocation went unacknowledged in the United 
States. Penetration was partially hindered by language barriers, since some of the 
first European studies were not published in English or translated in literature 
reviews. Evidence also suggests that most American clinicians were not searching 
for such adverse health reactions. As one physician from Guy’s Hospital, London, 
speculated: ‘The most probable explanation for the absence of these cases from the 
American literature is that they have not been looked for particularly.’30 Funding for 
medical research was also paltry during the 1920s and 1930s and this restricted 
                                                 
29 M. DeTeyssien, ‘Acute Poliomyelitis Following an Injection of Anti-Cholera 
Vaccine’, Journal de médecine de Bordeaux, 92 (February 1921), 77–78; M. 
Jarmulowicz, ‘Two Cases of Poliomyelitis Following Anti-Smallpox Vaccination,’ Rev. 
Neurol., 37 (January 1930): 92-93; E. Molinari, ‘Poliomyelitis: Common Prodromal 
Symptoms and Therapy of Paralysis Following Anti-Smallpox Vaccination: 
Colibacillary Etiology,’ Gazzetta degli ospedali e delle cliniche, 55 (February 1934): 
226-232. 
30 W. H. Bradley, ‘Section of Epidemiology and State Medicine,’ Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Medicine (1950): 775-782. 
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certain lines of inquiry.31 Linguistic barriers, narrow clinical pursuits, and funding 
restrictions conspired to limit propagation of the hypothesis. 
Despite impediments to dissemination, the provocation of polio by injections 
was briefly considered by American researchers in the mid-1930s in an effort to 
understand a polio vaccine disaster.32 In 1934, Philadelphia researcher Dr John 
Kolmer conducted a series of human medical experiments with his prototype live-
virus vaccine. After testing the concoction on himself and his children, Kolmer 
proceeded to administer it to over 10,000 children in New York City. When it became 
apparent that some children receiving the test vaccine subsequently suffered 
adverse health reactions and polio paralysis, Kolmer terminated his study.33 In trying 
to understand what went wrong, some scientists reasoned that local tissue irritation 
caused by the injection had contributed to the unusually severe paralysis.34 Although 
this conclusion bore remarkable similarity to earlier European findings, it did not 
stimulate American researchers to expand their inquiry. 
After World War II, however, attention to polio provocation increased in 
tandem with the expansion of public health programs for diphtheria, pertussis, and 
                                                 
31 Harry Marks, The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the 
United States, 1900-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapter 
2. 
32 H. V. Wyatt, ‘Provocation Poliomyelitis: Neglected Clinical Observations from 1914 
to 1950,’ Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 55, 4 (1981), 550. 
33 Rogers, Dirt and Disease, 171-172. 
34 Halpern, Lesser Harms, 48-57; John R. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 393. 
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tetanus.35 The convergence of epidemiological surveillance and the application of 
statistical methods permitted quantifiable assessments of immunization practices 
and potential adverse reactions.36 One of the first detailed studies emerged from 
Guy’s and Evelina Hospitals, London. The study’s author identified seventeen cases 
of polio paralysis that had developed in the limb injected with pertussis, tetanus, 
typhus inoculations. The association was reportedly ‘of sufficient importance to make 
one consider prophylactic measures.’37 As American researchers pondered 
European reports, a supporting Australian study was released by Dr Bertram P. 
McCloskey. After reviewing case histories from South Australia and Victoria, 
McCloskey testified that inoculations appeared to be a leading causative factor in 
polio paralysis.38 Based on 340 case histories, McCloskey described a link between 
the site of inoculation and paralysis, as well as the increased risk within three months 
of receiving an injection. Upon consulting with health officials at the Commonwealth 
Serum Laboratories and the superintendent of the Infectious Diseases Hospital, 
McCloskey concluded that they all ‘agreed that there was certainly evidence of some 
association between prophylactic injections and development of poliomyelitis in the 
                                                 
35 DeTeyssien, ‘Acute Poliomyelitis,’ 77-78. 
36 Elizabeth W. Etheridge, Sentinel for Health: A History of the Centers for Disease 
Control (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Mark E. Rushefsky and 
Deborah R. McFarlane, The Politics of Public Health in the United States (Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2005). 
37 J. K. Martin, ‘Local Paralysis in Children after Injections,’ Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 25, 121 (March 1950): 1-14. 
38 Bertram P. McCloskey, ‘The Relation of Prophylactic Inoculations to the Onset of 
Poliomyelitis,’ The Lancet (April 1950): 659-663. 
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epidemic.’39 Clinical observations derived from over four nations across two 
continents had established a theory that American researchers and doctors could no 
longer ignore. 
The European and Australian studies were met by most American public 
health officials with scepticism. The New York City Assistant Health Commissioner 
claimed that there was ‘no evidence at this time to substantiate the results.’ Similarly, 
other health professionals reasoned that polio provocation was perhaps the product 
of geographical or population idiosyncrasies pertinent to other continents. ‘It would 
be extremely unwise to accept conclusions arrived at on the basis of English and 
Australian experience as applicable to the conditions existing in New York City,’ 
explained the Commissioner of Health. ‘We must make our own observations and 
reach our own conclusions.’ For these health officials, it was rash to believe that a 
seemingly foreign theory was relevant to the United States until it was proven by 
examining local cases using local methods.40 
American epidemiologists and researchers scrambled to apply American 
realities to the problem. Among the first to investigate was the New York City 
Department of Health, which reviewed epidemiological data for over 2,000 local polio 
cases.41 Meanwhile, Anderson, already a staunch supporter of the tonsillectomy 
theory of polio provocation, turned his attention to the role of injections by examining 
2,709 case histories from a 1946 outbreak. Anderson’s study was compiled from 
family interviews conducted retrospectively by nurses and medical students. He 
                                                 
39 McCloskey, ‘The Relation of Prophylactic Inoculations,’ 662. 
40 Arthur Gelb, ‘Polio Link Sought To Immunity ‘Shots,’’ New York Times, 29 
September 1950, 23. 
41 Ibid. 
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reasoned that this method ‘increased the accuracy,’ since sufficient time had passed 
to achieve full disclosure unclouded by ‘emotional stress.’ Corroborating the 
Australian and English results, Anderson found that ‘in poliomyelitis patients who 
have received some antigen during the month prior to onset there is a high degree 
correlation between site of paralysis and site of injection.’42 Even though his findings 
were not conclusive, they offered a strong indication rooted in American data that 
common public health injections appeared to exacerbate paralytic polio. 
In addition to Anderson’s findings, some American laboratory researchers 
bolstered the theory. Studies undertaken by the New York State Department of 
Health laboratory showed that mice injected with tetanus or pertussis toxoids 
suffered a higher risk of paralysis following exposure to encephalomyelitis virus. ‘The 
frequency of paralysis in the inoculated extremity was 7 or more times greater than 
among the untreated controls,’ researchers concluded.43 Although these animal 
studies used a different virus to assess the adverse health link, they offered a 
reproducible model of a complex underlying epidemiological mechanism. It was 
becoming evident to some American health professionals that children receiving 
injections during polio season were being burdened with a new health risk. 
The epidemiological mechanism behind polio provocation was vigorously 
debated and as the Editor of Pediatrics conceded: ‘just how this is brought about 
                                                 
42 Gaylord W. Anderson and Audrey E. Skaar, ‘Poliomyelitis Occurring After Antigen 
Injections,’ Pediatrics, 7, 6 (June 1951): 741-759. 
43 Dean, Donald J., Cohen, Sophia M., and Dalldorf, Gilbert, ‘The Effect of Unrelated 
Vaccines on the Localization of Paralysis in Mouse Encephalomyelitis,’ Proc. Soc. 
Exper. Biol. & Med., 77 (1951): 834-836. 
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remains a mystery.’44 According to one hypothesis, inoculums injured tissue in a 
manner comparable to severe fatigue, which weakened the body and predisposed it 
to viral infection. Others posited that inoculations were perhaps contaminated with 
viral matter and were sources of infection.45 Another implicated syringes reused 
without proper sterilization as the root of the problem. A more refined proposal, 
advanced by Dr Harold K. Faber of the Stanford University School of Medicine in 
San Francisco, suggested that poliovirus present on the skin of children was being 
driven into the body during the injection, thereby seeding it into the tissue.46 The lack 
of certainty over what caused polio provocation increased anxiety and brought the 
issue to mainstream attention. 
Although toxoid-based immunizations, such as those for pertussis, diphtheria, 
and tetanus, appeared to play a leading role in polio provocation, other types of 
injections were implicated. Studies undertaken at the New York State Department of 
Health by Bureau of Epidemiology and Communicable Disease Control director Dr 
Robert F. Korns found a similar link with injections of sedatives, penicillin, hormones, 
vitamins, and Novocain used in dental work.47 As an established epidemiologist with 
                                                 
44 Editorial, The Journal of Pediatrics, 38, 6 (June 1951): 781-782. 
45 Martin, ‘Local Paralysis in Children,’ 3. 
46 Harold K. Faber, ‘Postinoculation Poliomyelitis,’ Pediatrics, 7, 2 (1951): 300-304. 
47 Harry Weaver, Editorial, June 1951, Series 3: Gamma Globulin Field Trial, Box 3, 
Surveys and Studies Records, March of Dimes Archives, White Plains, New York 
(henceforth denoted as MDA); Robert F. Korns, Robert M. Albrecht, Frances B. 
Locke, ‘The Association of Parenteral Injections With Poliomyelitis,’ American 
Journal of Public Health, 42, 2 (February 1952): 153-169; Robert M. Albrecht and 
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a doctoral degree from Johns Hopkins University, Korns’ findings carried 
considerable influence in medical and public health communities.48 Like Anderson, 
he derived his evidence from case histories gathered from family and patient 
interviews. According to Korns, each informant ‘was interrogated on the type of 
material injected, the site, the date, and the name of the attending physician’ to 
assess how injections may have predisposed the individual to polio.49 Unlike earlier 
surveys, Korns attempted to increase the statistical rigor by including a control group 
comprised of neighbours and household contacts. His results appeared startling: 
common injections doubled the rate of sustaining polio paralysis for up to two 
months following the inoculation.50 For many health professionals it was apparent 
that the theory affected both private practice medicine and public health programs. 
As American studies confirmed European and Australian findings, many 
health professionals lobbied for a widespread suspension of immunization programs. 
Anderson reasoned that ‘postponement of immunization during the periods when 
poliomyelitis is prevalent will avoid any possibility of its conditioning an unfavourable 
response to the infection.’51 Most state and national medical societies, including the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Frances B. Locke, ‘Effect of Physical Activity on Prognosis of Poliomyelitis,’ Journal 
of the American Medical Association, 146, 9 (1951): 769-771. 
48 David M. Herszenhorn, ‘Robert F. Korns, 82, Researcher Who Helped Test Polio 
Vaccine,’ New York Times, 16 October 1995. 
49 ‘Proceedings of the Committee on Immunization of the National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis,’ 6 July 1951, Box 244, Folder 4, Dr Jonas E. Salk Papers, 
Mandeville Library, California, 1. 
50 Ibid., 17. 
51 Anderson and Skaar, ‘Poliomyelitis Occurring After Antigen Injections,’ p. 758. 
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American Medical Association concurred, thereby sending a strong message to their 
members that the risk of inciting polio was not to be ignored.52 During the early 
1950s, the theory of polio provocation developed into a significant medical issue, 
spurring professional debate and surprising health policy changes. 
 
Health Risks and Policy Debates 
 
Informed by medical sources, resourceful journalists brought news that certain 
injections could provoke polio to the American public. The Dixon, Illinois, Evening 
Telegraph, advised parents to ‘Postpone Vaccinations for Children During Warm 
Polio Months.’ Another publication warned readers that ‘doctors found that more 
children under 5 years old developed polio within a month after vaccinations for 
whooping cough [pertussis] and diphtheria than non-vaccinated youngsters.’53 
National newspapers, such as the New York Times, warned readers that polio 
paralysis due to immunizations ‘usually involved the limb in which the injection had 
been given.’54 As dramatic headlines bombarded Americans, parents were asked to 
weigh on behalf of their children the potential risks of immunization with its purported 
benefits.55 
Some families of those stricken with polio in the aftermath of injections voiced 
criticism of public health programs and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Australian 
                                                 
52 Alton L. Blakeslee, ‘Doctors Advise: Postpone Vaccinations for Children During 
Warm Polio Months,’ Dixon Evening Telegraph, 29 May 1951, 9. 
53 Ibid. 
54 R. K. P., ‘Factors That Predispose to Polio,’ 135. 
55 Colgrove, State of Immunity, Chapter 3. 
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parents reportedly ‘were naturally inclined to blame the inoculations’ and demanded 
that their physicians consider the likelihood of the association.56 In the United States, 
some citizens pursued litigation against pharmaceutical companies, who they 
believed were responsible for selling contaminated vaccines. In 1947, the American 
public learned that Helen Covington and her husband Daniel of New Kensington, 
Pennsylvania, had brought a combined $200,000 suit against Wyeth Inc. in the 
United States District Court. Covington contended that Wyeth’s rabies vaccine 
contained ‘organisms, germs and other ingredients which rendered it unfit, unsafe 
and unsuitable for the purpose for which, it was intended’ and thus ‘produced partial 
paralysis’ in her leg. Although Covington did not attribute her paralysis to a polio 
infection, the implication that vaccinations could inspire a neurological condition only 
amplified public concerns surrounding injections.57 
As the foremost polio charity, the NFIP waded into the debate.58 Since the 
NFIP was recognized by most Americans as a leader in polio care and medical 
research, pressure was placed on the organization to offer an official position. In 
June 1951, NFIP research director Dr Harry M. Weaver issued a tactful press 
release.59 He assured parents and health professionals ‘that recent warnings linking 
immunization injections and the development of a paralytic form of poliomyelitis were 
                                                 
56 Betram P. McCloskey, ‘The Relation of Prophylactic Inoculations to the Onset of 
Poliomyelitis,’ The Lancet (April 1950), p. 659. 
57 ‘Woman Files Suit Against Drug Co.,’ Indiana Evening Gazette, 19 July 1947, 10; 
‘Couple Sues Firm for Antitoxin,’ Chester Times, 18 July 1947, 11. 
58 Dr. Weaver, Editorial, June 1951, Series 3: Gamma Globulin Field Trial, Box 3, 
Surveys and Studies Records, MDA. 
59 ‘Polio Fund’s Views on Injection Ban,’ New York Times, 21 June 1951, 28. 
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based on tentative evidence.’ He advised that until further studies were undertaken 
to substantiate the correlations observed by Korns and Anderson, it was best to 
avoid ‘indiscriminate injections’ during polio epidemics.60 Although Weaver did not 
define what he meant by ‘indiscriminate,’ his press release acknowledged the merit 
of the prevailing medical consensus and the need for doctors to assess the possible 
dangers on a case-by-case basis. 
The polio provocation theory led to extraordinary shifts in public health policy. 
A growing cultural sensitivity to risk and risk aversion in post-war America inspired 
these cautionary policies.61 The Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Immunization 
and Therapeutic Procedures advised its members to stop conducting immunizations 
during polio epidemics.62 The U.S. Surgeon General offered similar words of caution 
by declaring that medical studies showed ‘some risk’ with administering injections 
during ‘polio season.’63 Due to the unpredictability of epidemics, New York State 
Health Commissioner Dr Herman E. Hilleboe issued a directive to all county and city 
public health officers that ‘all elective immunization procedures on persons over six 
months of age be discontinued during the poliomyelitis season.’64 Hilleboe reasoned 
that the risk of provoking polio was more serious than the risk of other childhood 
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diseases.65 Heeding this mandate, New York City health officials halted pertussis 
and diphtheria inoculations at child health stations, as well as advised private 
practice physicians to ‘suspend standard immunization inoculations for children.’66 
State laws mandating paediatric vaccinations before school admission were also 
relaxed.67 Acknowledging the unusual change in policy, the City Health 
Commissioner explained that ‘since investigation has shown a probable relation 
between immunization during the polio season and the localization of paralysis, we 
are postponing immunization until the danger is over.’68 Due to public awareness and 
mounting evidence corroborating the theory, health officials and clinicians adjusted 
practices to reduce perceived risks. 
Not all health officers agreed with New York’s pre-emptive ‘ban on polio 
season inoculations’ and some openly challenged the directive. Westchester County 
Health Commissioner Dr William A. Holla attacked Hillaboe’s policy, believing that 
evidence did not ‘justify such a drastic measure’ and that adherence to such policies 
‘would put medicine back into the dark ages.’ Encouraged by county physicians, 
Holla pressed his case. He argued that polio provocation was ‘based on untested 
theories . . . associated with the use of the hypodermic needle.’ Upon this rationale, 
he explained that one could also ‘outlaw Novocain, blood tests, and treatment of hay 
fever and other allergies.’ Instead, Holla advised Westchester County doctors to 
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continue to ‘give primary immunization against diphtheria, whooping cough and 
tetanus . . . but omit restimulating injections (booster shots) until further notice.’69 By 
issuing his own counter-directive, Holla freed county physicians from disciplinary 
action, while ultimately assuming personal liability for the consequences. Although 
appearing to dispute the theory, Holla’s directive was a compromise, recognizing that 
certain injections should be omitted during the epidemic season. Even among 
dissenters there was a grudging acceptance of a possible link between childhood 
inoculations and ensuing paralysis. 
Like Westchester County public health officials, some doctors reacted to the 
debate over polio provocation with anger and frustration. One physician at the 
Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia expressed disappointment at the lack of 
precision within the debate and branded it the product of ‘hysteria.’ He explained that 
Anderson’s findings only implicated injections given within one month before the 
onset of illness, not those given prior to that time. He further reasoned that while 
inoculations might play a role in exacerbating polio under certain conditions, they 
played ‘no part in the etiology’ of polio. ‘The public and many public health 
authorities,’ he continued, ‘are reacting to the serious detriment of the overall 
disease prevention picture.’ For such clinicians, ambiguity and scare tactics were 
inspiring regressive health policies.70 
Sharing a sentiment of suspicion, a few state and county health departments 
rejected the polio provocation theory and pleaded for calm. In July 1951, the State 
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Health Commissioner of Massachusetts issued a statement that condemned 
seemingly alarmist reports. ‘These claims,’ he explained, ‘have been featured in the 
public press and some parents and your board of health have been disturbed in 
regard to immunizations which are now needed.’71 The Commissioner asked that 
parents ‘weigh the danger’ of postponing or omitting immunizations for diphtheria 
and pertussis with the possibility that such injections might cause polio. Promising 
citizens that the state would most likely witness fewer polio cases in the coming year, 
he urged them that ‘there would be no reason to postpone any immunizations.’ In 
this instance, parents, not doctors, were asked to balance the health risks. In turn, 
the Director of the Massachusetts Communicable Diseases Commission attempted 
to discredit the theory. He assured parents that ‘the original observer in Australia 
[McCloskey] was able to collect only 30 cases in which there appeared to be a 
relationship between immunizations and increased paralysis.’ He implied a similar 
lack of credibility to the results at Guy’s and Evelina Hospitals in London. Although 
Anderson and Korns brought forward American data to substantiate the theory, such 
studies were not discussed.72 For some detractors of the theory, the uncertain 
perception of foreign research served as an expedient means to strengthen their 
own assertions. 
Although a few health professionals rejected the polio provocation theory, 
evidence suggests that most accommodated its possibility. Like New York City, the 
District of Columbia, advised doctors against administering booster shots during the 
summer and recommended they consider ‘the relative risk of withholding an injection 
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or giving one.’73 Yet despite divisions, each group of health professionals believed 
that their respective approach represented the best interests of the public and their 
patients. In fact, advocates of the polio provocation theory reasoned that the risk of 
paralysis due to an injection was too high to condone orthodox practices; for 
dissenters, the hazard of declining herd immunity was by far the greater risk. As the 
theory resurrected public discomfort about the potential dangers associated with 
certain immunizations, medical professionals were united in trying to maintain faith in 
public health programs and the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship.74 
 
Polio Provocation and Medical Experimentation 
 
The prospect of a human medical experiment roused further uncertainty and 
debate about polio provocation. In the spring of 1951, Dr William McD. Hammon of 
the University of Pittsburgh and his collaborator Dr Joseph Stokes, Jr., of the 
Children’s Hospital Philadelphia asked the NFIP to support a study assessing the 
human blood fraction gamma globulin (GG) as a means to prevent paralytic polio. 
Hammon’s clinical trial protocol required a proving ground in which residents were 
experiencing a high incidence, early-stage polio epidemic; half of the paediatric 
cohort would be injected with 4 to 11 cc. of GG, while the other half would receive an 
equivalent volume of inert gelatin. By tracking emergent polio cases at the test site 
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and later comparing paralysis rates in the two groups from a decoded inoculation 
schedule, Hammon believed that the safety and efficacy of GG could be 
ascertained.75  
However, since many American health professionals reasoned that paediatric 
injections should be avoided during polio outbreaks, Hammon’s plan to administer 
large dose inoculations to thousands of healthy children challenged medical opinion. 
Although no studies specifically implicated GG or gelatin as provoking agents, the 
fact that similar practices and serums appeared to cause paralysis threatened the 
presumed safety of the study. Hammon reasoned that since GG was a licensed 
substance and was already used by a small number of doctors for polio prevention 
without evidence of its efficacy, the balance of risk was in favour of generating 
scientific knowledge. He hoped that learning whether or not GG was an effective 
agent against polio would reap wider benefits. 
Opposition to Hammon’s trial was manifest among many public health leaders 
and polio researchers. Although debate was initially sporadic and limited to private 
correspondence, it was soon consolidated through the NFIP Committee on 
Immunization. Hammon’s experimental protocol was initially presented at the 
inaugural gathering of the Committee in May 1951. In attendance were prominent 
researchers and health professionals, including Dr Jonas E. Salk and Dr Albert B. 
Sabin, as well as representatives from the Division of Biologics Control, the 
American National Red Cross, and the American Medical Association. Out of a 
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growing concern, NFIP officials purposefully invited some of the most prominent 
medical minds to discuss the potential benefits and risks of the GG experiment.76 
After reviewing the protocol, most Committee members were opposed to the 
plan. In particular, they were distressed by the risks associated with polio 
provocation and offered testimony as to their belief in the adverse health link. ‘Some 
of us heard the papers of both Anderson and Korns in Baltimore,’ one attendee 
explained; ‘I think most of us . . . were pretty well convinced that Korns’ data was as 
good as Anderson’s data.’ Based on these findings, one polio researcher warned 
that if Hammon’s trial went ahead, one ‘might almost expect an increase in the 
amount of paralysis’ in the injected control group.77 Until the theory was better 
understood, Committee members deemed that an experiment with GG was too 
dangerous.78 Hammon was shaken by the lack of confidence, but committed to 
appeasing his critics.79 Even though the polio provocation theory stood to scupper 
the proposed experiment, Hammon and his allies were far from defeated. 
Hammon and NFIP officials attempted to assuage concerns and build 
consensus for the protocol. To achieve these ends, NFIP officials invited Korns to 
present and defend his data at a subsequent gathering of the Committee.80 In July 
1951, Committee members listened as Korns expounded on his earlier studies, 
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methodology, and the range of inoculations that appeared to instigate polio paralysis. 
Korns was confident that a link existed. ‘As to how large a role this phenomenon 
plays,’ he concluded, ‘the best we can say is that it seems to be double the hazard of 
getting polio and double the hazard of getting paralytic polio.’81 
Korns’ presentation legitimized Committee delegates’ prior trepidation and 
opposition to the GG experiment, but Hammon and his allies attacked the data and 
the conclusions. They chided Korns for failure to delineate his analysis by the 
localization of paralysis and identified a potential weakness in the sampling method. 
They also inferred that Korns’ overall correlations with nonimmunizing agents might 
be erroneous, since the results could not be corroborated with those published by 
Anderson.82 Although Korns’ study was shown to harbour deficiencies, the debate 
remained unresolved. As one Committee member keenly observed, ‘the risk remains 
undefined, in my mind, as it was during the last meeting, and I think we should be 
guided as much by the consideration of whether or not it is worth taking that 
undefined risk.’83 
Hammon was emboldened after discrediting Korns’ findings and accordingly 
reasoned that there was no reason why he could not proceed with his clinical trial.84 
As a compromise to this request, Committee members agreed to authorize a small 
pilot study among 5,000 healthy children, which would serve as a litmus test for 
public reception and an appraisal of any adverse health reactions. ‘There will not be 
enough people injected to find out whether it is going to do much good,’ one 
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Committee member acknowledged. ‘We are going to try to find out whether it would 
cause a lot of harm.’85 Although most attendees were unenthusiastic about enrolling 
children in a safety test of GG during a polio epidemic, a pilot study appeared as a 
lesser evil than a large clinical trial. With the assistance of allies, Hammon received 
peer approval to launch a pilot study. 
When news emerged that the NFIP Committee on Immunization was 
‘unanimous’ in approving Hammon’s pilot study, some leading public health officials 
expressed dismay.86 Anderson emerged as one of the most vocal opponents to the 
plan. During an epidemiological training session at the Communicable Disease 
Center in Atlanta, Georgia, Anderson confronted Hammon’s collaborator Stokes, 
inquiring why support for the GG experiment remained when the polio provocation 
theory appeared so robust. After this encounter Stokes reported to Hammon that 
Anderson ‘still strongly disapproves of our study.’87 Although Stokes failed to counter 
Anderson’s concerns, he sought to dissuade antagonism by drawing attention to the 
inevitability of GG’s clinical use in polio prevention as the primary rationale for the 
study. 
Despite outward displays of confidence, Hammon was frustrated by 
Anderson’s objections and considered them the result of professional obstinacy. ‘I 
am sorry that Gaylord Anderson still disproves of our study,’ he replied to Stokes, 
‘but knowing him as I do I imagine he will continue to stubbornly remain of the same 
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opinion despite all arguments.’ While marginalizing professional criticism, Hammon 
privately admitted to Stokes that Anderson’s fears about GG injections provoking 
polio might be well founded: ‘I hope he is not right,’ he conceded.88 Like other 
members on the Committee, Hammon could only hope that polio paralysis would not 
be exacerbated by his experiment. 
New York State Health Commissioner Hilleboe was also distressed by the 
decision to undertake the GG experiment. Committed to an overall injection ban, 
Hilleboe could not fathom how NFIP officials, on the vanguard of polio prevention, 
could disregard prevailing medical opinion. He penned a protest letter to NFIP 
director Weaver, who in turn, sought to curtail dissent. In classic diplomatic style, 
Weaver thanked Hilleboe for his letter and mitigated his concern by explaining that 
members of Committee had already given polio provocation ‘very serious 
consideration.’ Moreover, he noted that Korns had reported to the Committee and 
that he might be available to clarify ‘a number of details that I cannot go into in a 
letter.’ Weaver’s reference to Korns served not only to challenge Hilleboe, but to 
divest justification for contentious decisions onto others. Although acknowledging 
that injected placebo controls were best avoided whenever possible, Weaver 
concluded that they were necessary to assess ‘the usefulness of gamma globulin.’89 
He ultimately placated Hilleboe by linking the momentum to proceed with a claimed 
majority scientific opinion. By corresponding with concerned public health thought-
leaders, NFIP officials helped Hammon deflect criticism and quash debate. 
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In an effort to mitigate the potential health risks, Hammon revised his 
experimental protocol. In particular, he decided to exclude children under two years 
of age from the pilot study, since they were believed to be the most susceptible to 
polio provocation. He also defined a method to reduce viral contamination on the 
injection tables by using changeable paper covers.90 Moreover, skin around the 
injection site would be disinfected with iodine and wiped clean with alcohol. Hammon 
reasoned that these clinical procedures would reduce tissue irritation and help to 
prevent the poliovirus from being driven into the body.91 To measure the potential 
harm of his experiment, Hammon required injections to be made in ‘the right buttock 
so that it could be determined later whether there was any association between the 
site of inoculation and the distribution of paralysis.’92 Although his revised protocol 
could not eliminate the risk of polio provocation, it represented an expedient 
response and acknowledgement that the theory had bearing on his trial. 
In September 1951, Hammon and his allies launched the GG pilot study in 
Utah County, Utah. With the endorsement of the local and state medical societies, 
they enrolled over 5,000 civilian children to serve as human subjects. Although Utah 
parents were asked to volunteer their children and to sign a legal waiver, Hammon 
did not acknowledge the possible health risks or his measurement of polio 
provocation.93 Akin to other American researchers who conducted human 
experiments at mid-century, Hammon was anxious about how his proposed studies 
might be perceived and whether an honest admission of risks might limit volunteer 
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enrolment. Medical ethics suffered under these circumstances, as the interests of 
children and their parents became subordinated to those of the researchers.94 
Despite Hammon’s intention to assess polio provocation, the pilot study failed 
to provide an answer. After comparing the paralytic incidence rates in the GG group, 
the gelatin group, and the uninjected group, Hammon reasoned that the data 
showed no alarming adverse reactions.95 However, he acknowledged that ‘the actual 
number of cases occurring in the various groups [were] too small to permit the 
drawing of statistically significant conclusions.’ He admitted that his imprecise 
evaluation was unfortunate, but conceded that his protocol was primarily designed to 
measure the efficacy of GG for polio.96 Although the pilot study left the polio 
provocation theory unresolved, the character of the experiment acknowledged the 
risk. Indeed, Hammon’s decision to restrict the enrolment age and modify his 
protocol to reduce viral contamination showed a grudging recognition of polio 
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provocation. However, for Hammon, the balance of risk favoured the generation of 
knowledge over the immediate safety of child subjects. 
 
The Refinement and Renaissance of Polio Provocation 
 
While the epidemiological mechanism of polio provocation remained beyond 
the reach of American researchers during the 1950s, most health professionals 
acknowledged the theory’s merit and its possible health consequences. By 1952, it 
was refined to implicate toxoid-based immunizations as the most likely provoking 
substances. Medical and health organizations, such as the NFIP, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, American Medical Association, and American Public Health 
Association reported their consensus. In a joint statement they agreed that ‘injections 
against the common infectious diseases such as diphtheria, whooping cough and 
tetanus be postponed during periods of high poliomyelitis incidence unless the risk of 
the disease to be prevented by the injections is greater than the presumed risk of 
converting an asymptomatic poliomyelitis infection into a paralytic one, or of 
localizing the paralysis to the injected extremity by means of the injection.’97 As a 
result, many American doctors and public health officials postponed common 
paediatric immunizations during polio epidemics.98 Cognisance of local realities and 
cycles of disease slowly became part of clinical practice when administering toxoid-
based immunizations. 
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As the polio provocation theory was further refined, other injectable 
substances, such as sedatives, vitamins, and antibiotics were exonerated from 
suspicion. Public health thought-leaders, recognizing the growing uncertainty over 
what constituted a risk, attempted to educate parents about the distinctions. One 
1952 article in the Washington Post explained the official position of the United 
States Public Health Service, asserting that ‘no parent should object and no 
physician should hesitate to administer a needed antibiotic, drug, or other injection 
for treatment of a disease at any time.’99 Similarly, GG escaped crushing indictments 
in the aftermath of subsequent clinical studies undertaken in 1952 with over 50,000 
children in Texas, Iowa, and Nebraska. Hammon’s buoyant characterization of these 
later studies rationalized a national GG immunization program against polio in 1953 
and 1954.100 Although refinement of the polio provocation theory did not discount the 
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risks posed by other injections, it merely situated them as less significant than they 
were before. 
Concerns over polio provocation slowly waned after the first effective polio 
vaccine developed by Salk was licensed in April 1955. Most Americans expressed 
great relief at the imminent victory over epidemic polio. One observer remembered 
‘A man was crying and shouting as he tossed down copies of a special edition of the 
newspaper. When everyone finally understood his words there was great joy – a 
giddiness that can only be experienced at the end of a time of terror.’101 As millions 
of children became vaccinated before epidemic season, the incidence of polio 
dropped considerably.102 For some polio survivors, the victory was bitter-sweet: ‘My 
first reaction was anger,’ recalled one patient, ‘but it was selfish anger. It was anger 
that it didn’t happen sooner . . . But I was so grateful that no one else would have to 
go through this. It was really something to celebrate.’103 The later Sabin oral polio 
vaccine led to a further reduction in the number of reported cases.104 In a nation no 
longer threatened by polio outbreaks or the related risk of polio provocation, 
Americans turned their attention to more pressing public health threats. Although the 
epidemiological mechanism behind polio provocation remained uncharted, research 
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into such questions appeared indulgent and unnecessary. The dawn of the polio 
vaccine temporarily relegated polio provocation to the archives of medical history. 
The theory of polio provocation lay dormant for decades, but re-emerged in 
the 1980s when large aid agencies, such as the World Health Organization and 
Rotary International, expanded immunization programs in developing nations. In 
Africa, public health workers began to notice cases of polio paralysis following 
certain paediatric inoculations against common diseases. Intrigued by the evidence, 
Dr H. Vivian Wyatt of the Department of Clinical Medicine at Leeds University turned 
to timeworn medical journals in search of a possible answer. After reflecting on the 
polio provocation debates of the 1950s, Wyatt became convinced that health 
workers in Africa were observing the manifestation of a forgotten theory. ‘It appears,’ 
he explained, ‘that “injection paralysis” has scientific grounds for its existence and 
that indeed the localization in the affected limb is a direct effect of the injection, as 
Congo mothers have so long asserted.’105 Wyatt was persuaded that polio 
provocation had clinical relevance and he hoped that his publications would inspire 
fresh research into the correlation and reforms to public health practice. 
Wyatt’s work brought a measure of attention to the theory, but it was not until 
polio epidemics swept through India in the 1990s that the concept was systematically 
re-examined. A clinical study among children in rural India found that ‘injections 
given for treatment of fevers . . . may play a role in precipitating paralytic 
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poliomyelitis.’106 A subsequent assessment corroborated this data, concluding that 
‘the only significant risk factor for paralytic illness was having received any injection 
in the 30 days before onset.’107 Based on results echoing those from decades 
before, some health professionals advised that ‘injections in polio-endemic countries 
should only be indicated when other therapeutic options have failed or are not 
available.’108 However, not all health officials were convinced by the data. One group 
of researchers at the National Institute of Communicable Diseases in India 
challenged the suggestion that the DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccine 
exacerbated the 1992 polio epidemic at a Delphi orphanage.109 We ‘do not attribute 
the occurrence of febrile illnesses in 21% of children in the orphanage to the 
inflammation from the DPT,’ concluded Institute staff.110 Akin to 1950s America, 
health professionals in India were divided over the interpretation of clinical data and 
corresponding health risks. 
                                                 
106 M. Varghese, I. Qadeer, D. Mohan, ‘Paralytic Poliomyelitis in a Rural Area of 
North India,’ The National Medical Journal of India, 10, 1 (Jan-Feb 1997): 8-10. 
107 K. A. Kohler, W. G. Hlady, K. Banerjee, R. W. Sutter, ‘Outbreak of Poliomyelitis 
Due to Type 3 Poliovirus, Northern India, 1999-2000: Injections a Major Contributing 
Factor,’ International Journal of Epidemiology, 32, 2 (April 2003): 272-7. 
108 Ibid. 
109 J. Singh, S. Khare, R.S. Sharma, T. Verghese, ‘An Explosive Outbreak of 
Poliomyelitis in an Orphanage in Delhi: Risk Factors for the Unusually High Attack 
Rates,’ Indian Pediatrics, 34 (1997): 135-139. 
110 J. Singh, S. Khare, R.S. Sharma, and T. Verghese, ‘Reply,’ Indian Pediatrics 
(1997): 847-848. 
SE Mawdsley 37 
Evidence that certain injections could provoke polio in India inspired a range 
of criticisms levelled at international aid organizations and local government 
agencies. Wyatt maintained his commitment to promoting awareness of polio 
provocation and he worked with Indian health officials to assess the 
consequences.111 In an article published in the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics he 
asserted: ‘Since 1980 unnecessary injections have probably produced paralysis in 
more than 600,000 Indian children who might, otherwise, have got away with non-
paralytic polio and worsened paralysis in another million children.’112 In agreement 
with Wyatt, some Indian paediatricians speculated that perhaps thousands of 
children had become paralyzed because of misinformed immunization policies. One 
physician at the Indian Academy of Pediatrics openly condemned her government 
for pursing ‘a polio immunization policy advocated by the World Health Organization 
which was unsuitable for Indian conditions.’113 For some critics of Indian 
immunization policies, the trust of parents and the wellbeing of children were being 
undermined by some health professionals’ ignorance and complacency. Until polio 
provocation was better understood, there remained ample room for a subjective 
interpretation of clinical findings. 
It was not until the late 1990s that the polio provocation debate shifted in 
response to fresh scientific discoveries. In 1998, Drs Matthias Gromeier and Eckard 
                                                 
111 H.V. Wyatt, S. Mahadevan, S. Srinivasan, ‘Unnecessary Injections and Paralytic 
Poliomyelitis in India,’ Trans Roy Soc Med Hyg., 86 (1992): 546-549. 
112 H. V. Wyatt, ‘A View From The West: Health Warning: Injections Can Endanger 
Health,’ Issues Med Ethics, 4, 1 (1996): 14-15. 
113 Ganapati Mudur, ‘Flawed Immunisation Policies in India Led to Polio Paralysis,’ 
British Medical Journal (April 1998): 316. 
SE Mawdsley 38 
Wimmer at the State University of New York uncovered what appeared to be the 
epidemiological mechanism behind polio provocation: muscle injury sustained by an 
injection facilitated viral invasion and its transmission to the spinal cord. Through this 
and subsequent corroborative laboratory findings, polio provocation migrated from a 
clinical theory to a clinical model.114 However, the growing acceptance of polio 
provocation posed challenges for health professionals and aid agencies. In western 
and developed countries, which largely controlled epidemic polio through 
immunization programs that preserved herd immunity, substantiation of the theory 
did not necessitate health policy changes. By contrast, in nations where polio was 
endemic, immunization priorities and sequence mattered. Changing 
characterisations of risk, ascribed to the power of evidence grounded in laboratory 
research and the expectation of increased longevity, placed pressure on policy-
makers to review the balance of risks. In particular, evidence suggested that polio 
vaccination needed to be undertaken a priori of other paediatric immunizations in 
order to reduce the chance of provoking polio.115 Public health officials, researchers, 
and international charities remain engaged with this issue as they negotiate its 
implications and reassess immunization practices.116 
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Conclusions 
 
The contentious history of polio provocation shows the challenges that health 
professionals faced when reacting to evidence of possible adverse reactions. 
Knowledge of polio provocation failed to penetrate American society in the 1920s, 
but by the 1950s it had become a minor cause célèbre. Although most doctors and 
public health officials believed certain paediatric injections could provoke polio, a 
failure to unravel the epidemiological mechanism allowed causation theories to spiral 
and divisions to congeal. For some health professionals, polio provocation was a 
fact, justifying injection bans and the consideration of seasonal epidemic factors; for 
others, it was a misguided hypothesis that risked regressive public health practices 
and the loss of herd immunity. Both sides believed that their respective positions 
reflected maximum public health benefit. For a few medical researchers, such as 
Hammon, knowledge derived from human experimentation promised the greatest 
advantage. He reasoned that the risk of provoking polio during his pilot study was 
acceptable on the grounds that generating knowledge about the value of GG would 
benefit the most people. 
Despite fear and a lack of clarity surrounding polio provocation, most 
American health professionals at mid-century reached a compromise in which 
immunization practices were reformed to account for the risk. For such thought-
leaders, the temporary reduction in herd immunity appeared less dangerous than the 
possibility of inciting polio. With the introduction of the Salk and Sabin vaccines, 
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traditional public health practices resumed and polio provocation slipped into clinical 
dormancy. However, the 1980s renaissance showed the human costs when 
disagreements over clinical evidence and uncertainty about causation prevail. 
Although discovery of the epidemiological mechanism behind polio provocation in 
the 1990s established a clinical model, such findings did not resolve the issue. 
Instead, the politics of international aid and transnational public health posed new 
challenges. Balancing risks for polio provocation became more than an effort to save 
lives and reduce suffering, but a negotiation between how health professionals 
interpreted knowledge with how they chose to act on it. 
